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1. INTRODUCTION 
Specific performance constitutes, in common law parlance, the 
order of a court by which the breaching party to a contract is 
compeIled to perform the activity contemplated in the contract.1 In 
civil law countries, specific performance is considered a normal 
remedy that may be requested by the aggrieved party in case of any 
breach of any contract.2 Common law countries, on the other hand, 
have developed a very particular system of protection of rights, which 
has traditionally condemned specific performance to a sort of 
ostracism among the remedies for breach of contract.3 The traditional 
* This contribution is made as part of a Project of the Spanish Ministry of Science and 
Innovation with reference DER2008-02244/JURI on Uniform Law and its incidence on 
Spanish and European Commercial Law, with special regard to the 2004 UNIDROIT 
PrincipIes and Intemational Commercial Arbitration. Professor María del Pilar Perales 
Viscasillas is the leading scholar in that project, and 1 am fully indebted to her for her 
comments on an earlier (and extended) draft. Without her advice, this paper would not 
have been possible. 1 also fully appreciate the discussion with professor Loukas Mistelis, 
Queen Mary University, to whom 1 owe the insights on the substance/procedure 
dichotomy. Needless to say, a11 errors and inaccuracies, involuntary as they may be, 
remain the sole responsibility of the author. 
1 JONES, Gareth; GOODHART, William Specific Perfonnal1ce London: Butterworths, 
1996, p.l. 
2 LAITHIER, Yves-Marie. "Comparative Reflections on the French Law of Remedies for 
Breach of Contract," in COHEN, Nihil; McKENDRICK, Ewan, Comparative Remedies for 
Breacll of COl/tract. (PortIand, Hart Publishing, 2005) p. 103; ZIMMERMAN, Reinhard. The 
LalO of Obligatiotls. Roman Foul1dations of the Civilian Tradition. (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1996) p. 776; BEALE, Hugh; KOTZ, Hein; HARTKAMP, Arthur; 
TALLON, Denis. (gen. eds.). Casebooks OH the Common LalO of Europe. COllhnct LalO, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2002, p. 677; TRElTEL, G.H. Remedies for Bread! of Contracto A 
Comparatíve Account (Oxford, CIarendon Press, 1988) p. 48. 
3 The explanation of the problem Hes in the oId system of administration of royal 
justice. The Kíng exercised his iuris dictio through a system of courts of common law, 
where his subjects carne to obtain redress for the wrongs committed against them. The 
number and variety of plaints made the system virtuaIly unmanageable, hence the 
creation of the forms of action: documents with the Great Seal in them, which already 
contained pre-determined redress, with each action presenting certain formal conditions 
to be compHed with in order for the action to be exercised. The forrns of action 
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view notwithstanding, even the most recalcitrant detradors of specifíc 
performance now admit that it may constitute a useful remedy, and 
thus its role in contract law should be expanded.4 Then, if the tendency 
points towards the admission of non-pecuniary remedies in ordinary 
commenced as a system of bureaucratic administration, with the possibility to create 
new actions if the case did not fit in one of the existing forms. It was not long until it 
acquired juridical ground, amI what was not in the forms was not in the world, in the 
sense that no protection could be dispensed. The evolution turned the common law 
system of the forms of action rigid and obsolete, leaving numerous cases without an 
adequate solution. It is at this point that the figure of the Chancellor appears on the 
stage. Traditionally, the Chancellor was something like a prime minister for the King, 
who also advised him when the King himse1f carried on judicial functions as the "King 
in Council" (the Chancellor was a member of the Council). In fact, though Royal justice 
was ordinarily administered by cornmon law courts, the subjects could come to the King 
to ask for redress as of Royal grace. The multiplication of complaints, as well as the need 
for the King to focus on other problems, provided for the delegation of responsibilities to 
the Chancellor, who cornmenced as an intermediary between King and subjects, and 
ended assuming the judicial function himself. The Chancellor could not decide upon the 
law, as the subjects normally requested justice from the King when their case had been 
neglected by cornmon law courts, which were in charge of applying the law. Thus, the 
cases were decided upon equity, understood as the justice according to the specific 
circumstances of the case and a sense of morality, provided the generalities of the law 
had failed to do justice in the particular case (hence the denomination of the justice 
administered by the Chancellor as equity jurisdiction). The justice of the Chancellor 
relied on his power to act in personam, through coercion by jail sentences; and thus, was 
ideally suited fot orders to perform, as opposed to the justice of common law, better for 
pecuniary remedies. Both systems remained, and the English justice system evolved into 
an oddity with different jurisdictions, administering different remedies (pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary), but deciding upon cases of the same nature, with consequent 
overIapping. This led to tensions between both jurisdictions, and the faster evolution of 
common law courts, and the development of the theory of contract by them, led to their 
standing as a regular jurisdiction, while the equity jurisdiction remained as an 
alternative mechanism, only for cases where cornmon law courts did not provide an 
adequate remedy. This eventually affected the standing of specific performance as a 
remedy, which followed the destiny of the jurisdiction that administered it, and the 
consequences can still be felt today. MAlTLAND, F.W. Equity. A COllrSe 01 Lectures. 
Revised by John Brunyate, M.A. Cambridge: University Press, 1936, reprinted 1969, p. 2-
3; HOLDSWORTH, Sir William A History 01 English Law op. cit. Volume 1, p. 395-401, 424-
428, 437-442, 459-465; BAKER, J.H. An Introductiol! fo English Legal History. London: 
Butterworths, 2002, p. 318-321. 
4 FISS, Owen "The Supreme Coutt 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice" Harl1ard 
Law Review no. 93 (1979), p. 29; JONES, Gareth; GOODHART, William. "Specific 
Peiformance." London: Butterworths, 1996, p. 4; LAYCOCK, Douglas "The Death of the 
Irreparable hljury Rule" Harvard Law Re"l,íelO no. 103 (1990), p. 687; VAN HECKE. 
"Olanging Emphases in Specific Performance" North Carolina Law &'VielO. (1961), no. 40, 
p.I-22. On the economic efficiency of specific performance, see LINZER, Peter. "On the 
Amorality of Contract Remedies - Efficiency, Equity and the Second Restatement" 
Columbia LalO Review. (1981.), no. 81, p. 120, note 82; SCHWARTZ, Alan. The Case for 
Specific Performance, Yale Lalo ¡oumal. 1979-1980, no. 89, p. 271~306; ULEN, Thomas S. 
The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theorv oí Contract Remedies, 
Míchigan Law Review, (1984-1985), no. 83, p.341-403. • 
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jurisdiction, why make such a fuss about non-pecuniary remedies in 
arbitration? 
The answer is legal only in part, as the problem has also a 
psychological side. One of the foundations of arbitration is the 
emphasis on preserving its nature as an alternative dispute resolution 
means, offered together with plain application of the law, commercial 
expertise, and a careful analysis of the specific facts of the case. The 
final aim of all this is to back the decision with the strongest power of 
all: the power of common sense.5 
This study is devoted to disentangling the described idealistic 
vision from its actual manifestations in the power of arbitrators to 
order non-pecuniary remedies. To that end, we split the problems into 
three parts. In Part U, we address the distinction between substance 
and procedure, since we consider that it strongly influences the debate 
over arbitrators' remedial power. In Part IU, we actuaIly examine the 
arbitrators' power to order typical non-pecuniary remedies. 
Injunctions and specific performance have, despite the lack of attention 
by legal writing, a substantial presence in case law records, which 
helps to build basic general principIes. Finally, we do not intend to 
limit our study to classic manifestations of non-monetary relief. 
Rather, as we see in Part IV, problems actually surface when the 
remedy awarded goes beyond the strict performance of the contracto 
This phenomenon reveals that, aside from coercion, what constitutes a 
cumbersome problem for arbitration (as well as for adjudication) is the 
exercise of arbitral powers to somehow "manage," 11 arrange" or 
"organize" the future of the parties' relationship. Hence the reference 
in the title to pro futuro orders, rather than orders of performance. 
2. IS THIS RESEARCH WORTHY AT ALL? NON-PECUNIARY 
REMEDIES AND THE SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 
DICHOTOMY 
2.1 Introduction 
lf we want to initiate our study of pro futuro orders in arbitration 
by asking ourselves whether arbitrators have the power to order 
performance of the contract, we need to know that the very question 
5 In the words of Aristotle, arbitration, as opposed to adjudication, applies equity, 
instead of the law. See ARISTÓTELES. Retórica. Madrid: Gredos, 1999, Libro 1, Capítulo 
13. Equity, in turn, is characterized as the justice according to the circumstances of the 
case, as opposed to the generalities of the law. See ARISTÓTELES. Ética Nicomáquea -
Ética eudemia. Madrid: Gredos, 1985, Libro V, Capítulo 10. 
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might be biased. By framing it in those terms, we assume that pro 
futuro orders must be dealt with from the perspective of the arbitrators' 
power, rather than that of the parties' rights, hence the focus on 
procedural and not substantive law. From a procedural point of view, 
the key would be in analyzing the arbitrators' ability to "create" or 
"fashion" an appropriate remedy that satisfies the parties' needs. 
From a substantive perspective, the remedy would exist (or not) in the 
applicable substantive law, and it is not a subject of controversy that 
arbitrators have the power to apply that law. Therefore, the nature of 
the order to pedorm becomes of great importance as a preliminary 
issue to be solved before going any further. Because the right to 
performance or the performance decree has been so far the most 
popular remedy of such kind, our discussion focuses primarily on it. 
2.2 Non-pecuniary remedies: substantive or procedural? 
The answer to this question depends much on whether we depart 
from a civil law or a cornmon law perspective. Civil law countries 
have inherited the codification process and, as such, the legislators 
will to provide certainty. The emphasis on what the parties may 
request from the courts and not on the courts may award in their 
discretion has been caUed the "rights model."6 In this context, the 
notion of substantive law stretches from primary rights (i.e., those that 
directly stem from a contract), to secondary rights (Le., those that arise 
from the breach of primary rights). Cornmon law countries, on the 
other hand, have inherited the system of the forrns of action, where the 
emphasis is placed on the action exercised and the order requested 
from the court, rather than on the right protected by such an order. 
This has been called the "remedies model,"7 where the procedural 
aspects are of utmost importance. That strong distinction would lead 
us to condude that, while in civil law countries specific performance 
would be a matter oí substance, in cornmon law countries it would be 
a matter of procedure8 and, there, as the old saying goes, 11 substance" 
and "procedure" would be equivalent to "right" and "remedy."9 
6 FRIEDMANN, Daniel, "Rights and Remedies", in CDHEN, Nihil; McKENDRlCK, 
Ewan. Comparative Remedies for Breac1, of Contracto Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005, p. 8. 
7 Ibid p. 3 et seq. 
8 See Collins in Dicey & Morris, who states that "English lawyers gave the widest 
possible extension to the meaning of the term 'procedure.'" COLLINS, Lawrence, et al. 
(eds.). Dicey ami Morrís OH tite Conflict of L¡¡ws (2 vols.), London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, 
Volume 1, p.169. 
9 Eric Railroad v. TompJ.:ins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In the words of Collins, "The nature of the 
remedy is a matter of procedure to be determined by the lex fori." COLLlNS, Lawrence, 
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Nevertheless, by sticking to old categories, we risk making a 
merely nominal analysis. Identifying procedure with remedy may be 
arbitrary if we do not know what a remedy really consists of. In this 
sense, it has been argued that, when a remedy is so close to a right that 
neglecting one could imply neglecting the other, then we should 
assume that the remedy enjoys a substantive nature.10 Such would be 
the case with the right to performance, as there cannot be a remedy 
with a closer logicallink to a contractual right than that of performance 
of the right.n 
The international instruments on conflict of laws appear to follow 
this trend. The Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations states that the law applicable to the contract 
governs the consequences of the breach.12 That includes remedies for 
breach of contract,13 and the right to request performance among them. 
That view, though, would risk neglecting the role of procedural 
law in the achievement of enforced performance, as well as, generally, 
in the administration of remedies. Such importance is acknowledged 
by the Rome Convention itself, which provides that substantive law 
will cover the consequences of the breach "within the limits of the 
powers conferred on the court by its procedurallaw."14 
The problem with opening the gate to procedurallaw is that, if its 
role is emphasized too much, it could provide an argument to bring 
specific performance back to procedure. Indeed, if the court has to 
et al. (eds.). Dicey and Morns on the Conflict ofLaws (2 vols.), London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1993, Volume 1, p. 171. 
10 COOK, Walter Wheeler, "'Substance' and 'Proceduré in the Conflict of Laws," 42 Yale 1. 
]. 333,343 (1933); Capylease Corp. of Am. v. Memorex Corp., 408 F. Supp. 758 (SDNY 1976). 
11 Indeed, sorne scholars have argued that even "tertiary" rights, conceived to enforce 
the right to performance in case of a recalcitrant breaching party, like the right to request 
punitive fines, should be considered a matter of substance. See MOURRE, Alexis, 
"Judicial Penalties and Specific Performance in International Arbitration," Chapter 22, 
infra. 
12 Artiele 10 of the Rome Convention establishes that: 
"The law applicable to a contraet by virtue of Artieles 3 to 6 and 12 of this Convention 
shall govem in particular: [ ... ] 
(c) [ ... J the consequences of breach, ineluding the assessment of damages in so far as it is 
govemed by rules of law¡" 
13 As stated by Professors Giuliano and Lagarde in the Rapport on the Rome 
Convention, "The expression 'consequences of breach' refers to the consequences which 
the law or the contract attaches to the breach of a contractual obligation, whether it is a 
matter of the liability of the party to whom the breach is attributable or oI a elaim to 
termínate the contract for breach. Any requirement of service of notice on the partr to 
assume hisliability also comes within this context." REPORT on tite CO/lIlcntíon 011 the Jaw 
applicable to contractual obligatíolls. Available at http://www.rome-convention.org/ 
instruments/ Lrep_lagarde_en.htm. 
14 See Artiele 10 Rome Convention. 
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examine its powers to decide on specific performance, common law 
countries allow the courts to award or deny specific performance as a 
matter of discretion.15 And it would not be hard to argue that 
something that depends upon the discretion of the court cannot be 
claimed as of right, and therefore is not substantive but procedural in 
nature.16 Should that be our final conclusion? 
Not quite. First, if every margin of discretion excluded the 
substantive nature, then we could not talk of any rights whatsoever, as, 
to sorne, the very notion of a right is equivalent to a prediction that the 
courts will act in a certain way if behaviour contrary to that right is 
undertakenP Second, the role of discretion in specific performance in 
common law countries should not be exaggerated. The repetition of 
court practice and the publication of judicial decisions have greatly 
contributed to the development of an abundant case law, and the 
crystallization of numerous principIes that inform the decision on 
specific performance.18 Even if the outcome of a specific performance 
request were more uncertain than one of damages, there wouId still be 
sufficient predictability to permit discussion of a "right" of specific 
performance. 
That seems to be the trend received by uniform law. The 1980 
Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
("CISG"), the UNIDROIT PrincipIes for International Commercial 
Contracts, and the PrincipIes of European Contract Law, all texts on 
contract law (of substantive nature), contempIate the right to obtain 
performance within their provisions.19 Article 28 of the CISG, which 
15 McCLINTOCK, Henry L. Handbook of Equity Sto Paul: West Publishing CO. (Hombook 
Series) 1936, p. 1; POMEROY, John Norton Jr. Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence and Equitable 
Remedies Six Volumes. Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence in Four Volumes, Third Edition, 
Annotated and much enlarged, and supplemented by A Treatise 011 Equitable Remedies in 
two volumes, San Francisco: Bancroft~Whitney Company, 1905 § 762, p. 1284; DOBBS, 
Dan. Remedies: Equity, Dmnages, Restituiioll. St. PauI: West Publishing Co. (Hombook 
Series) 1993, § 2.4 (7) p. 84; De FUNIAK, William Q. Halldbook of Modem Equity Second 
Edition. Boston, Toronto: LittIe, Brown and Company, § 94, p. 221. 
16 COLLINS, Lawrence, et al. (eds.). Dicey mld Morris on the Conflict ofLaws op. di. p.l71. 
17 "For legal purposes a right is only a hypostasis of a prophecy - the imagination of a 
substance supporting the fact that the public force will be brought to bear upon those 
who do things saíd to contravene it - just as we talk of the force of gravitation 
accounting for the conduct of bodies in space." See HOLMES, Oliver Wendell, Natural 
Law, 32 HARVARD L. RJ,y. 40, 42 (1918). See also HOLMES, Oliver Wendell. The Path of 
the Law, 10 HARVARD L. REY. 1, 1-2 (1897). 
18 De FUNIAK, William Q., Handbook of Modem Equity, Second Edition, Boston, Toronto: 
tittle, Brown and Company, § 94, p. 221; DOBBS, Dan B Law of Remedies. Damages - Equity _ 
Restitutioll op. cit. § 2.4 (7), p. 84-85í POMEROY, John Norton Jr. POMEROY, John Norton 
Pomeroy's Equity Juri&prudellce and Equitable Remedies op. cit. § 762, p. 1284-1285. 
19 Article 46 (1) CISG provides: "The buyer may require performance by the seller of his 
obligations unIess the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this 
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allows a tribunal to deny performance if the a result would be contrary 
to íts own law,20 does not change the characterization of the remedy. It 
merely introduces a concession to those countries (common law 
countries) that are more restrictive towards the remedy of performance 
than the Vienna Convention itself.21 
requirement;" and Artide 62 reads: "The seller may require the buyer to pay the price, 
take delivery or perform his other obligations, unIess the seller has resorted to a 
remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement." Artide 7.2.1. of the UNIDROIT 
PrincipIes states: "Where a party who is obliged to pay money does not do so, the 
other party may require payment," while artide 7.2.2. provides: "Where a party who 
owes an obligation other than one to pay money does not perform, the other party 
may require performance ... " In the PrincipIes of European Contract Law, artiele 
9:102 (1) states that "The aggrieved party is entitled to specific performance of an 
obligation other than one to pay money, ineluding the remedying of a defective 
performance;" and artide 9:101 (1) provides: "The creditor is entitled to recover 
money which is due." 
20 Artide 28 CISG states: "If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one 
party is entitled to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is 
not bound to enter a judgement for specific performance unless the court would do so 
under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this 
Convention." 
21 The controversy about the adoption of a general rule favouring specific performance 
during drafting of the Convention was based upon two main factors. First, there were 
countries where certain aspects of the right to specific performance were unknown (e.g., 
a right to request repair), and there were no procedural mechanisms to enforce them. 
Consequently, a first draft of the current Artiele 28 was introduced with a reference to 
the possibility of the court to deny the request when it could not do so under its own law. 
Later, this position was expanded at the request of Anglo-Saxon delegations, who 
considered that the peculiaritíes of their own systems (where specific performance was 
an exceptional remedy) were important enough to put aside the goal of uniformity in 
this case. This inability to reach a compromise solution has been strongly criticised. See 
LANDO, Ole. "Commentary to Artiele 28" in BlANCA, Cessare Massimo; BONNELL, 
Michael Joachim. Commentary on fhe Infernational Sales Law. Milán: Giuffré, 1987, para. 
1.3, p. 233; KASTELY, Amy. "The Right to Require Performance in Internatíonal Sales: 
Towards an International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention" Washington Law 
Review no. 63 (1988), p. 627; WALT, Steven. "Fo! Specific Performance Under the United 
Nations Sales Convention". Texas International Law ¡ournal no. 26 (1991), p. 218. In any 
event, the evidence on the application of Artide 28 remains sparse. Only in one case was 
this provision applied (Mage/lan Internatiorzal v. Sa/zgitter Handel Federal District Court 
[Louisiana] 7 December 1999). 1t was an American case; hence the Uniform Commercial 
Code was applied. The court did not deny specific performance; only sent the case again 
to the lower court, as it considered that the "inability to effectuate a cover transaction" 
(necessary to award specific performance under Section § 2-716 of the UCC) had not 
been properIy established. To our view, in that case it did not seem that the elaimant was 
trying to convince the court to exercise its discretion. Instead, the party seemed to claim 
specific performance as of right, once of course the "difficulty to cover" threshold had 
been established. 
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2.3 Why discuss the role of non-pecuniary remedies in 
arbitration? 
With the arguments exposed, we could conclude that 
performance is a right of the parties, not a power of judgesj arbitrators, 
and, consequently, the study of the laUer would be of no use. Several 
other arguments, however, point towards the opposite conclusion, and 
thus recommend precaution. 
First, although we are arguing for the substantive nature or the 
"right to performance," we cannot but recognize the merit of the 
procedural approach, especially considering that sorne of the most 
important case law on this problem is constructed from a procedural 
perspective. Second, even accepting the substantive nature of the 
problem - i.e., the right to performance, rather than the power to order 
performance - there would still be issues of the arbitrators' powers to 
be dealt with. The most obvious is the problem of determining, once 
the contents of the applicable substantive law are clear, what degree of 
discretion is granted to the arbitrator to apply the law. In other words, 
what power the does the arbitrator have to shape the law to the 
drcumstances of the case where there has been a request for the 
performance of the contract?22 
In any event, the importance of the procedural perspective, 
focused on the power of arbitrators, is harder to be seen when the 
request seeks the specific performance of the contract. In that case, the 
remedy has such long standing that the arbitrator' s role is hardly 
11 creative" in the sense of 11 fashioning" an adequate relief. The case is 
very different, and this constitutes the third argument, when the order 
is not for the strict performance of the contracto Indeed, orders of 
performance only constitute the tip of the iceberg of a wider problem 
like that of pro futuro orders. Once we abandon striet adherence to the 
language of the contract and focus on resolving a complex dispute 
between the parties, the clarity that we achieved when dealing with 
pure performance orders blurs and vanishes. 
In conclusion, it is not possible to discard the problem of the 
power of arbitrators to order performance. In any event, the 
discussion about the nature of the right of performancejpower to 
order performance provided us with sufficient insight for the 
following parts o this chapter, not always to provide the right answer, 
yet to pose the right questions. 
22 Inft'Q at 1II(F). 
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3. FOUNDATIONS OF ARBITRATORS' POWER TO MAKE 
PRO FUTURO ORDERS: EXPERIENCE WITH SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
Once the relevance of the problem has been set, we need to 
effectively determine the basis on wmch the power of arbitrators to 
fasmon an appropriate non-pecuniary remedy relies. The main sources 
are no secret, being, on the one hand, the parties' will through the 
conclusion of an arbitration agreement and the selection of a set of 
arbitration rules; and, on the other hand, the law applicable to the 
procedure and substance of the dispute. The findings, though, are 
very much based upon the experience with "typical" non-pecuniary 
relief, i.e., specific performance and injunctions. If those are the 
remedies requested, it is not hard to even justify the arbitrators' power 
from a functional approach and extend it to the ability to shape 
substantive law to the needs of the case, even if the result may seem 
contrary to the policy behind the law. As a result, some of the 
conclusions reached with the specific performance experience may be 
too harsh if applied bluntly to other non-monetary relief. 
Clarifications and qualifications aside, however, the following analysis 
provides the necessary foundations to build up a general policy on 
arbitrators' non-pecuniary power. 
3.2 Orders of performance, arbitrators' power and the 
arbitration c1ause 
Arbitration is about consent. Despite alI the niceties we may say 
about the arbitral functíon, or about arbitration as a mechanism for 
dispute resolution, alI arbitration ultimately relies on the parties' will 
to submit to it. Consequently, it makes sense to begin any explanation 
related to the arbitrators' power by referring to its primary source (and 
limit): the arbitration agreement. 
3.2.1 Arbitranon clause as a source 01 arbitrators' power 
As the sovereigns who set the conditions of the dispute, the 
parties may clarify the remedial problem by expressly giving the 
arbitrators the power to grant non-pecuniary remedies. If such is the 
parties' will, there is nothing better than to so state expressly in the 
arbitration clause. Cases can be mainly found in Anglo-Saxon 
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jurisdictions like the United States (probably because the parties díd 
not take for granted that the arbítrator could íssue non-pecuníary 
orders).23 
Arbítrators' remedíal power, however, is hardly somethíng the 
partíes consider when drafting the arbítration agreement. Thus, it is 
usually special circumstances that bring the issue to the parties' 
attention. That is the case where the kind of dispute likely to arise 
23 In Young v. Deschler, 202 Mise. 811, 110 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1952) the parties agreed 
to an arbitration clause that stated: "Any controversy arising under this agreement shall 
be submitted to arbitration to be held in the City of New York in accordance with the 
rules of the American Arbitration Association, before at least three arbitrators. Said 
arbitrators may, in their award, recommend the granting of equitable or other injunctive 
reHef as may be suitable." After the subscription of the agreement the parties disagreed 
on whether to proceed with arbitration. The Court of Appeals ruled that "On the facts 
and circumstances of this case, all issues in the controversy between the parties including 
the validity, application or limitation of the covenants in question, are for the arbitrators 
who may if they deem it proper decide such issues in plaintiff's or defendant's favour." 
In a similar way, in Lively v Hunter 130 Ga. 106, 60 S.E. 264 Ga. (1908) the parties needed 
to resolve a dispute on whether the construction of a storage facility for guano fertilizer 
damaged the plaintiff' s property, and thereby an injunction against construction was 
needed. In order to settle that, the parties concluded a (very long) arbitration agreement 
that stated: "Whereas, there is a matter of controversy between F.J. Hunter, as executor 
of Mrs. M. V. Medlock, deceased, and as the next friend of the children of Mrs. Medlock, 
as plaintiffs, v. C. P. Lively and H. M. Lively, now pending in Gwinnett superior court, 
in which the plaintiffs are seeking and have had granted a temporary injunction, 
restraining said defendants from using a certain warehouse situated on the right of way 
of the Southern Railroad Company, in the town of Norcross, in said county, fully 
described in the petition in said case, for the purposes of storing guano and commercial 
fertilizers, acids, or other manures in said house, to the injury and damage of plaintiffs 
and their property, either temporarily or permanently. And said parties have agreed to 
subrnit the question of nuisance or injury or damage to arbitration. And for this purpose 
the plaintiffs have selected T.B. Wray and defendants have selected Huburt Letrow as 
their arbitrators, and have also selected J. E. McElvoy as the third arbitrator, or umpire. 
Said award is to be conducted under the provisions of the Code of Georgia, known as 
the statufory arbitration, in the hearing of said case. Upon the hearing the only question 
to be submitted to and passed upon by said arbitrators is whether the health or property 
of said plaintiffs have been injured or damaged by the use of said warehouse as above 
stated and the injunction now in force shall be made permanent. And, in the event said 
arbitrators decide that said warehouse workefh hurf or injury to the health or property 
of said plaintiffs, then it is agreed that said defendants will not use the same for said 
purposes. The award to be refurned to and made the judgment of the superior court of 
said county. It is further agreed that the restraining order now in force shall be continued 
until the award is rendered by said arbitrators, and fhe case stand continued until such 
award i5 made. In witness whereof said parties have hereto set their hands and seals. 
This 27th day of October, 1904, c.P. Lively & Son. [L.s.] Fred Hunter [L.s.]". In deciding 
the ¡ssue, the arbitrators declared: "After hearing the evidence and considering the 
matter subrnitted to us, we find that the property of said defendants would be damaged 
by the use of said warehouse for the storing of commercial fertilizers as above stated. We 
therefore find in favour of said F.J. Hunter, executor, and that the injunction now in force 
be made permanent." 
THE POWER OF ARBITRATORS TO MAKE PRO-FUTURO ORDERS 101 
between the parties typically requires coercive action, e.g., collective 
bargaining disputes.24 Another classic situation occurs where the 
dispute has already arisen when the submission to arbitration is 
drafted; hence no ex ante arbitration agreement, or clause 
compromissoire, but an ex post agreement (compromis) is concluded.25 
Typically in these cases, the power was drawn from the language of 
the clause, but also from the very fact that it was, precisely, the duty to 
perform (or abstain from performing) that was submitted to 
arbitration.26 
3.2.2 Arbitration clause as a limit to arbitrators' power 
The parties' will may not only be utilized as a source of the 
arbitrators' power to order non-pecuniary remedies, but also as a limit 
of such power. The interpretation of such kind of limitation was at 
stake in the case Decca Music Group Limited v. Michael Jagger, Keith 
Richards, Charles Watts (also known as the Rolling Stones case).27 The 
parties signed an agreement for the management of royalties received 
24 If the problem concerns the reloeation of industrial facilities, a strike, or a close-down 
in breaeh of a eolleetive bargaining agreement, the way to enforee the parties' 
cornmitments will surely not be through monetary eompensation. Henee the kind of 
arbitration clauses inserted in these type of agreements, with a language that foresees the 
possibility of non-peeuniary remedies, e.g., "In applieation of any and all rights which 
the manager of the Union and the manager of the Association, or their deputies, or their 
Impartial Chairman may have pursuant to this agreement or by operation of law, it is 
agreed that in the event of any breaeh of the eolleetive agreement or any of the terms 
thereof by any one obliged thereunder, the manager of the Union and the manager of the 
Association, or their deputies, may, as part of their decision, issue anyand a11 mandatory 
direetions, prohibitions or orders directed to or against any party breaching the 
eolleetive agreement or any party thereof." (New York coat industry agreement); or "The 
award or decision of the arbitrator, in addition to granting such other relief as the 
arbitrator may deem proper, may contain provisions commanding or restraining aets 
and conduet of the parties." (garment industry). See FLEMING, R.W. "Arbitrators and 
the Remedy Power" Virginia Law Review Vol. 48 no. 7 (November 1962) p. 1203. The 
wide seope of the arbitration clause inserted in the eo11ective bargaining agreement 
eonstituted the base in Ruppert v Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576,148 N.E.2d 129,170 N.Y.S.2d 785 
(1958) for the arbitrator to order an anti-strike injunetion. 
25 CRAIG, W. Lawrenee; PARK, William W.; PAULSSON, Jan. IntematiorwZ ClIamher of 
Commerce Arbitration. Third Edition. New York: Oeeana Publieations, 1998, p. 37. 
26 In Young v. DeschZer, 202 Mise. 811, 110 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1952), it was not until 
after several claims of unfair competition that the parties decided to subscribe the 
compromis, and submit the arisen dispute to arbitration. In LiveZy v H¡mter, 130 Ga. 106, 
60 S.E. 264 Ga. (1908), it was not until after the executor of the Hunters' will sued the 
Livelys for an injunction that restrained them from ereeting the premises, and the courts 
had granted a temporary injunction that the parties agreed to an arbitration to detennine 
whether the injunction had to be made permanent. 
27 Decca Music Group Limited v. Míchael Jagger, Keifh Richards, Ozarles Watts, High Court of 
Justiee. Chaneery Division, Case No: HC 04 C00863, Royal COUtts of Justice, 11 June, 2004. 
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by the band.28 Besides the right to claim proceeds unduly retained by 
Decca, the band enjoyed a right to audit the accounts kept by Decca.29 
Interestingly, the parties established a division in the jurisdiction. The 
disputes between the parties were to be resolved in arbitration 
PROVIDED ALWAYS (read the clause) that the claim was for a 
monetary sum.30 
The clause' s meaning was tested when differences of opinion arose 
as to whether Decca was complying with its duties under the agreement, 
and the band exercised the right to account in front of ordinary courts, 
which Decca sought to declare incompetent.31 Addressing the issue as 
one of interpretation of the arbitration clause, the judge of the court of 
first instance admitted the claim, considering that it was not one for a 
monetary sum but one for specific performance.32 
28 Basically the arrangement consisted in the payment of the royalties from Decca to the 
bank, which, in tUID, would pay them to the band a while latero TIús way, they deferred 
the payment and, consequently, the tax liability (which was probably the reason why the 
agreement was subscribed to in the first place). 
29 The clause read as follows: "The Artist [that is, the Rolling Stones] may cause each 
account delivered to him pursuant to clause 5(3) to be audited by a leading Chartered 
Accountant appointed by him (the Auditor') and the Bank [ ... ] and the company [that 
is, Decca] or either of them (as the case may be) shall [ ... ] make available to the Auditor 
any and aH such books and records and other documents (whether or not similar to those 
enumerated) pertaining to the subject matter hereof which the Auditor may reasonably 
request for the purpose of performing his auditing duties." Decca Music Group Limited v. 
Michael laggel~ Keith Richards, Charles Watts High Court of Justice. Chancery Division. Case 
No. HC 04 C00863. Royal Courts of Justice. 11 June, 2004, para. 3-4. 
30 The clause read: "Any and every dispute c1ifference or question which may at any 
time arise upon under or in connection with or pursuant to this Agreement or touching 
or concerning the construction meaning effect valídity or enforceability thereof or of any 
provision thereof or concerning any aHeged determination or claim for rectification 
thereof shall be referred to a single arbitrator r ... ] PROVIDED ALWAYS that in the 
event of any claim by either of the parties hereto for breach of or otherwise arising out of 
or in connection with or pursuant to this Agreement the sole obligation of the other 
party in respect of such c1aim shall be to pay such sum as may be awarded upon 
arbitration pursuant to this clause and sucll arbitration or award shall be a candition precedent 
to the institutiolt of any actian at law or in equity." 
31 The Iaunch of the album Forty Licks was a success, and the band wanted to ensure that 
they were being paid the correcí amount. The argument of Decca was that the 
enforcement of the Iight to account was, in reality, a claim fOI a monetary sum, and thus, 
should be exercised through arbitration. In addition, Decca argued, provided the wide 
scope of the arbitration agreement, the band had to exhaust aH possibilities to settle the 
dispute by claiming a monetary sum before requesting non-pecuniary remedies. Decca 
Music Group Limited v. Mic1zael lagger, Keith Richards, Charles Watts, High Court of Justice, 
Chancery Division, Case No; HC 04 C00863. Royal Courts of }ustice, 11 June, 2004. 
32 The Court held (correctIy, in our opinion) that, though the right to audit couId be 
exercised jointIy with the right to request payment of the sums due, it couId also be 
exercised as an independent right, worth of separate protection (we presume as a right to 
control the management of the account). Furthermore, once specific performance was 
excluded, there was no possible way of protecting the right to audit and thus, exc1uding 
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Such was the conclusion until, on appeal, the tables were tumed.33 
The court revoked the first judgment, holding that the parties had 
expressed a preference for arbitration, that the right to audit could be 
properIy protected through a claim for the unpaid royalties, and thus, 
no equitable relief was needed.34 We believe that the case was 
incorrectly decided, as the comt neglected the parties' will in favour of 
resilient criteria of traditionallaw.35 It can be viewed as an example of 
comt overreach, and used to make the case for further clarity when 
drafting arbitration clauses limiting remedial power. 
3.3 Orders of performance, arbitrators' power and arbitration 
mIes 
Though we find examples where the arbitration clause contained 
an express attribution, or a limit, to the arbitrators' power to order 
performance, the practice on that remains scant, since the parties 
ordinary courts' jurisdiction would have been equivalent to neglecting the right. Decca 
Music Group Limited v. Michael Jagger, Keitlz Ric1mrds, Charles Watts, High Court of Justice, 
Chancery Division, Case No: HC 04 C00863, Royal Courts of Justice, 11 June, 2004. 
33 Michael Jagger, Keith Richards, Charles Watts Z'. Decca Musíc Group Ltd (2004) [2004J 
EWHC 2542 (Ch) Ch D (Purnfrey J) 12/11/2004. 
34 In the first place, the court affirmed that the language of the clause was wide enough 
to encompass a dispute relating to the right to audit the accounts. The court, however, 
seemed to forget the warning in capital letters "PROVIDED ALWAYS [ ... ]the sole 
obligation of the other party in respect of such claim shaII be to pay such sum as may be 
awarded .... " In the .second place, the court wondered whether the right contemplated 
under Clause 6 (right fo account) could not be properly enforced through a monetary 
claim and, as a consequence, whether arbitration and account were mutualIy exclusive 
("whether or not the obligation under Oause 6 is such that a breach is not capable of 
being compensated in damages with the resuIt that there is, in effect, a repugnancy 
between the arbitration clause and Clause 6"). The court concluded in the negative, 
stating that damages would be an adequate remedy. In this case, the court held, if there 
were a difference between amounts paid and amounts due, the damages would consist 
in that difference. If there were none, damages would be nominal ("It seems to me that 
prima facie the measure of damages for breach of Clause 6 should be arrived at as 
folIows. If on an audit under Clause 6 it would have been discovered that there had 
been an underpayment then the underpaid sum is the measure of damages. If on an 
audit under Clause 6 it were to be discovered that there had been no underpayment, 
then damages would be nominal only"). Michael Jagger, Keith Richards, Charles Watts v. 
Decca Music Group Ltd (2004) [2004] EWHC 2542 (Ch) Ch D (Pumfrey 1) 12/11/2004. 
35 The solution adopted by the court can be read only to mean neglecting any autonomy 
to the right of account. However, that would be contrary to the wilI of the parties, who 
separated the right from that to request a monetary sum, and put it in a separate clause. 
Besides, in the non-monetary enforcement of what right would the parties be thínking 
when drafting the clause, other than the right fo audit? The court decided the issue 
hidebound by the old saying that specific performance (and equity in general) may only 
act when damages are not an adequate remedy, without even considering whether the 
parties had that in mind when they drafted the arbitration clause. 
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seldom think about relief when drafting the agreement. Consequently, 
we find in the arbitration rules selected by the parties a secondary 
source and limit of power, in Hne with the parties' will. 
The case where non-monetary remedial power is established with 
crystal darity is that of the American Arbitration Association 
Arbitration Rules. Rule R-43 expressly establishes the arbitrators' 
power to order specific performance, among other equitable relief.36 
Other sector-specific rules of the AAA establish such remedial power 
for arbitrators as well.37 
The AAA Arbitration Rules have been the basis for arbitrators' 
orders of specific performance in numerous cases. The subject-matter 
of the cases where they have been used has been diverse, 
encompassing disputes on transfer of businesses,38 non-competition 
clauses,39 management,40 and construction contracts.41 
Although not explicitly, the Rules of the International Centre for 
Dispute Resolution (ICDR) also provide for the arbitrators' power to 
award non-pecuniary remedies. Artide 28 (5) of its Arbitration Rules 
expressly exdudes punitive damages among the remedies available to 
the arbitrators,42 which leads one to condude that all other 
conventional remedies are allowed.43 This conc1usion is confirmed by 
36 The Rule reads as follows: "(a) The arbitrator may grant any remed)' or relief that the 
arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties, 
including, but not limited to, specific performance of a contract." American Arbitration 
Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, Rule R-43, 
available at http://www.adr.org/RulesProcedures. 
:;7 Such i8 the case of Rule R-44 of the American Arbitration Association Construction 
Industry Arbitration Rules and Medíation Procedures; Rule 42 of the Patent Arbitration 
Rules states: "The arbitrator ma)' grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems 
just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties, including, but 
not limited to, specific performance of a contract or injunctive relief to tennínate 
infringement"); Rule 45 (Scope of award) of the Arbitration Rules for the Real Estate 
Industry (Including a Mediation Alternative); or Rule 37 c. of the Arbitration Rules for 
Wills and Trusts. 
38 General Fuse Co. v. Sightmaster Carpo 7 Misc.2d 997, 162 N.Y.S.2d 630 N.Y.Sup. (1957). 
39 Yaung v. Deschler, 202 Misc. 811,110 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1952). 
40 Staklinski v Pyramid Electric Campany, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78 N.Y. (1959) . 
.. 1 Grayson-Robinson Stores, Ine. V. Iris Construetion Carp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377 
N.Y. (1960). 
42 The provision reads: "UnIess the parties agree otherwise, the parties expressly waive 
ami fmego any right to punitive, exemplary or similar damages unless a statute requires 
that compensatory damages be increased in a specified manner. This provision shall not 
apply to an)' award of arbitration costs to a party to compensate for dilator)' or bad faith 
conduct in the arbitration." 
43 Other rules contemplate a similar solution, like article 32 (4) of the Chicago 
International Dispute Resolution Association (CIDRA) Arbitration Rules, which 
provides: "Unless the parties agree otherwise, the parties expressl)' waive and forego 
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the express reference of Article 28 (4) to the specificities of a pecuniary 
award}4 which, in our opinion, leaves implicit that there can be 
awards with non-pecuniary contento 
3.4 Orders of performance, arbitrators' power and the 
lex arbitri 
In the absence of explicit reference by the parties' arbitration 
agreement and the selected set of arbitration rules, another 
sourcejlimit for the arbitrators' power to order non-pecuniary 
remedies may be the law applicable to arbitral proceedings, i.e., the lex 
arbitrio Unfortunately there are few examples of arbitration laws 
entering into the specificities of the arbitrators' remedial power. 
Two such examples, however, are the English Arbitration Act, 
followed in this respect by the Irish Arbitration Act. Both instruments 
provide for a remedial power equal to that of ordinary courts, 
including the power to order specific performance, with the exception 
of contracts relating to land.45 Thus, English law, known to be the most 
restrictive towards the use of specific performance as a remedy is 
nevertheless ready to grant arbitrators such power. 
The only doubts relate to the scope of the limitation of remedial 
power in "contracts relating to land," a provision that, if interpreted 
too widely, could seriously hamper the arbitrators' ability to solve 
certain disputes. Fortunately, however, English courts generally leave 
arbitrators much r,oom to manoeuvre. In Telia Sonera46 the two parties 
any right to punitive, exemplary or similar damages unless a statute requires that 
eompensatory damages be inereased in a specified manner." 
oH Artiele 28 (4) of the ICDR Arbitration Rules reads: "A monetary award shall be in the 
eurreney or eurrencies of the eontrad unless the tribnnal eonsiders another eurreney 
more appropriate, and the tribunal may award sueh pre-award and post-award interest, 
simple or compound, as it eonsiders appropriate, taking into eonsideration the eontraet 
and applieable Iaw," 
45 Seetion 48 (5) of the English Arbitration Aet reads as follows: 
The tribunal has the same powers as the eourt 
(a) to order a party to do or refrain from doing anything; 
(b) to order speeifie performance of a eontrad (other than a eontrad relating to land); 
(e) to order the rectifieation, setting aside or cancellation of a deed or other 
document." 
Section 26 of the Irish Arbitration Aet provides: 
Unless; a eontrary intention is expressed therein, every arbitration agreement shall, 
where such a provision is applieable to the referenee, be deemed to contain a 
provision that the arbitrator or umpire shall have the same power as the Court to 
order specifie performance of any contract other than a eontrad relating to land or 
any interest in land. 
46 Telía Sonera AB t' Hilcourt Docklands Ltd, 4th JuIy 2003, Chancery Division, 
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had conc1uded alease contract, which inc1uded a covenant that 
committed the lessee to undertake certain repair works in the leased 
facilities, works it did not accompHsh. The lessor initiated arbitral 
proceedings to request an order for the works to be completed. The 
problem rested on whether, in such case, the arbitrators would have 
the power to order performance of the repair works. In both the 
arbitration stage and in ordinary courts, it was held that the limitation 
contained in the lex arbitri had to be interpreted restrictively, so as to 
inc1ude merely those cases where the subject matter of the dispute was 
the transfer or creation of a security interest in immovable property.47 
That interpretation leaves the arbitrators with powerful tools and 
a wide margin of discretion to resolve disputes. And those could be 
even wider if the parties so choose. In fact, the limits imposed upon 
the arbitral power He in the absence of the parties' contrary intention.48 
Were the parties to draft a more expansive arbitration c1ause, or to 
choose a set of arbitration rules that provided so, that would be the 
prevalent criterion, as the limits in the examined arbitration laws lack 
mandatory character, let alone a public policy nature. 
3.5 What if nothing is said? 
So far we have found examples where the arbitration agreement, 
arbitration rules, or lex aJ'bitrí act as sources of or limits to the arbitral 
power to order non-pecuniary remedies, especially specific performance. 
We should not deceive ourselves, however, by thinking that we may 
always expect an express reference to arbitrators' remedial power 
when we need it. In the immense majority of cases, neither parties nor 
arbitral institutions, nor legislatures, for that matter, pay sufficient 
attention to the issue of remedies. In such cases, we need to find 
alternative methods to draw powers and limits from the previously 
examined sources. 
3.5.1 Interpretation ofthe arbitration clause 
As stated before, cases where arbitration c1auses say nothing on 
the issue of arbitrators' remedial power constitute the immense 
majority. Yet the fact that this is common practice provides no 
47 Telia Sonera AB v Hilcourt Docklands Ltd, 4th JuIy 2003, Chancery Division. 
48 Section 48 (1) of the English Arbitration Act provides that: uThe parties are free to 
agree on the powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal as regards remedies." Section 26 
oí the lrish Arbitration Act explicitIy relies on the arbitration agreement for the 
arbitrators' remedial power, since it states: "UnIess a contrary intention is expressed 
thereín, every arbitration agreement shall [ ... ], be deemed to contain .... " 
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consolation. Thus, in almost alI cases arbitrators have fo decide on the 
request for relief without any express reference whatsoever indicating 
which was, or would be the parties' intention on non-pecuniary 
remedies. In these cases, should the rule for or against specific 
performance prevail? 
The issue has been addressed on several occasions, and the 
conclusion is unanimously favourable to the arbitral power. In some 
cases, the resuIt was reached through a "finalistic" interpretation, 
looking forward to giving "maximum utility" to the arbitration clause. 
There were cases where the dispute concerned compliance with duties 
that have no possible substitute if not performed by the contracting 
party, like those involving negative covenants. Thus, if the case 
concerns adherence to, say, a covenant not fo compete, denying the 
arbitrators the power to order performance would be equal to 
depriving arbitration, and the arbitration clause, of any effect.49 In 
other cases, not even negative obligations were expressed in the 
contracto Their content and the arbitrator' s power to enforce them 
specificalIy were drawn from the need to protect the main (positive) 
contractualobligation.5o 
In other cases, the "finalistic" interpretation and the "maximum 
utility" of the arbitration agreement have been carried one step further, 
with an interpretation independent of the kind of obligation assumed 
by the parties under the main contract. Thus, in some cases, the 
49 See, for example, Linwood v. S]¡erry, 16 Misc. 2d 488, 178 NYS2d 492, affd witllOut op. 7 
App. Div. 2d 757, 181 N.Y.5.2d 772 (1958); Utility Laundry Serv., Ine v. Sklar, 300 N.Y. 255, 
90 N.E.2d 178 (1949). In addition to non-competition clauses, there have been other 
situations that have tested the enforceability of negative promises through arbitration, 
like cases of collective labour relations, where parties have committed themselves not to 
move a factory to a different location (with the consequent layoff). See Goldstein v. Int'l 
Ladies' Gannent Workers' Uníon, 328 Pa. 385, 196 A. 43 (1938). 
50 Such was the case in Vogel v. Simoll, 26 Misc. 2d 436, 201 N.Y.52d 877 (N.Y.Sup.1960) 
where the parties concluded an agreement to distribute the assets of a partnership, 
without liquidating them (according to the agreement, the assets had to be "distributed 
to the parties as ratably and equitably as possible and in the event of inequality a cash 
adjustment shall be made between them"). Since they could not agree on that, they 
submitted the issue to arbitration, pursuant to another clause inserted in the agreement 
("If they cannot agree upon the terros of such distribution then the same shall be 
determined by arbitration as hereinafter provided"). It occurred that one of the parties 
performed some acts that were harmful for the value of the assets to be distributed. 
Thus, though the competence attributed to the arbitrator was declaratory, since the acts 
of the defendant were could affect the final outcome, the arbitrator considered himself 
competent to issue an order restraining activities harmful for the assets, and the court 
confirmed such competence by stating that the acts of the defendant, if he was not 
stopped in his tracks "may have an effect upon the ultimate problem of the distribution 
of the assets of the partnership." See Vogel 'l'. Simoll, 26 Misc. 2d 436, 201 N.Y.S.2d 877 
(N.Y.Sup.1960). 
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reference in the arbitration clause to the arbitrators jurisdiction to 
decide on 11 any dispute arising out of or relating to" the main contract 
has been interpreted to include disputes as to whether specific 
performance should or should not be ordered. Then, such jurisdiction 
implicitly (and logical1y) carries with itself the power to enforce it.51 
Finally, arbitration clauses have been stretched to their limit in cases 
where the arbitrators have considered the reference to the need that the 
settlement of disputes through arbitration be u final" to imply that, 
without the power to order performance, the dispute could not be 
finally settled, and thus, the arbitrators could not have fulfilled the 
mandate with which the parties entrusted them.52 
3.5.2 Interpretation of arbitration rules and lex arbitri 
The previous discussion shows a real creativity effort in the 
interpretation of the agreement in order to extract the power to order 
non-pecuniary remedies. Nevertheless, sometimes it is hard to extract 
a solid foundation for that power from language as concise as that of a 
standard arbitration agreement. For that reason, we should also tum 
our attention to more complex frameworks, like arbitration rules and 
arbitration laws that are more suitable for drawing inferences as to the 
arbitrators' powers. 
Although the following rules are silent on the remedial power vis-
a-vis the final award, we may reach a condusion on them by exarnining 
the provisions on interim measures of protection. The UNCITRAL 
51 In Freydberg Bros., lile. v. LelOís COrClj, 177 Mise. 560, 31 N.Y.S.2d 10 (N.Y. Sup. 1941) 
the arbitrators used language in the arbitration clause that stated H Any dispute of any 
nature that might arise between us is to be adjusted by the American Arbitration 
Association, and the award is lo be final and binding on both." [Emphasis added.] In a 
similar way, the arbitrators in Suffolk Development Corp. tl Pat-Plaza Amusement Corp., 236 
N.Y.S.2d 71 interpreted in that sense an arbitration clause stating Hany matter involving 
[ ... ] failure to perform any provision oI the lease.". In T.T. Gregory Gourmet v Antolle's 
Import, 927 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1995) the clause read HAll 
disputes, claims and questions regarding the rights and obligations of [AlC and J.J. 
Gregory] under the terms of this Agreement are subject to arbitration ... " Finally, in a 
more intemational setting, the ICC Award 7453 of 1994 used as a basis an arbitration 
clause stating HAll disputes arising in connection with the present contract .. ,," 
52 In Gelleral Fuse Co. n. Sightmaster Carp., 7 Misc.2d 997, 162 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y.Sup. 
1957) the parties submitted to arbitration a dispute over the valuation of a packet of 
shares. Because the parties had entrusted the arbitrator with the final resolution of the 
dispute, he not only valued the shares, but also ordered one of the parties to purchase 
them. In the ICC Award No. 7453 of 1994, the arbitrator supported the argument on the 
wide scope of the arbitration c1ause (" AH disputes arising in connection with the present 
contraen by referring to the final resolution of the dispute through arbitration (the 
clause continued "shall be finally settled ... by one ... arbitrator") to draw his power 
from the agreement. 
THE POWER OF ARBITRATORS TO MAKE PRO-FUTURO ORDERS 109 
Arbitration Rules indude in their Artide 26 a reference to the 
arbitrators' power to order u any interim measures it deems necessary 
in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute." Such language is 
mimicked by Artide 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration,53 and also by the rules of the most important 
arbitration institutions.54 Other texts, like the LCIA Arbitration Rules, 
or the Rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, indude 
references to the possibility of ordering in a provisional way any relief 
requested for the final award.55 Typical measures of interim protection 
are the orders of provisional performance or abstention.56 Therefore, if 
arbitrators are entitled to order performance on a provisional basis, 
they should have the power to order it in the final award, as, in most 
cases, a provisional order to perform will serve the purpose of 
preserving the final decision on the performance of the contracto 
3.5.3 Arbitrators' "inherent" power 
The previous examples show that it is possible to build elegant 
rhetorical bridges between the written words of agreements, rules and 
laws, and the actual powers of arbitrators. Would it be possible to 
build such bridges in the air? In other words, could we justify an 
53 Artíde 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Arbitratíon Law provides: "Unless otherwise 
agreed by the partíes, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, order any party 
to take sueh interim measure of proteetíon as the arbitral tribunal may eonsider 
neeessary in respeet of the subject-matter of the dispute ... " 
54 ICC Rules state, in their Artide 23 (Conservatoflj and 11lterim Measures), that "unIess the 
parties have otherwise agreed, as soon as the file has been transmitted to it, the Arbitral 
Tribunal may, at the request of a party, order any interim or eonservatory measure it 
deems appropriate." Similar language is employed by Artíde 43 of the Arbitration Rules 
of the China Intemational Eeonomic and Trade Arbitration Commission, Artide 26 of the 
Swiss Arbitration Association Arbitration Rules, and Artide 38 of the N etherlands 
Arbitration Institute Arbitration Rules, etc. 
55 The LCIA Arbitration Rules provide, in their Artide 25: (Illterim and Conservatory 
Measures) that: 
1. The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power, unIess otherwise agreed by the parties 
in writing, on the application of any party: 
e) to order on a provisional basis, subject to final determination in an award, any 
relief whieh the Arbitral Tribunal would have power to grant in an award, induding 
a provisional order for the payment of money or the disposition of property as 
between any parties. 
Artide 7 (8) of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Arbitration Rules provide: "The 
arbitratof has power to grant relief on a provisional basis in respect of the following 
matters: [ ... J(c) a provisional order for the grant of any relief daimed in the arbitration." 
56 BOND, Stephen R., The nature of conservatory and provisional measures, in: 
Conservatory and Provisional Measures in InternatíOllal Arbitratioll, París, ICC Publishing, 
1993, p.1L 
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arbitral power to order non-pecuniary remedies with no basis in the 
texts that serve as sources of and limits to such powers? 
The evidence suggests that it is, indeed, possible, if we follow the 
"inherent" or "implicit" powers approach. According to it, besides 
those contained in the arbitration agreement, arbitration rules, and lex 
arbitrí, arbitrators have the powers (including remedial powers) 
necessary to provide the function they were selected for, i.e., to solve 
the parties' dispute effectively.57 
. Indeed, this view only goes one step further than the extensive 
interpretation we have discussed aboye. When the basis is the 
arbitration agreement, it is interpreted in the sense that the function 
performed by the arbitrators in the specific case necessarily implied the 
power to order performance or abstention. When the basis is in the 
arbitration rules, or the lex arbitri, again, the existence of the power is 
evaluated in accordance with what is neceSSarY in the case at hand. 
Thus, stating that, arbitrators generally have the inherent power 
to order performance of or abstention from certain acts is no more than 
drawing a general inference from the empirical evidence of specific 
cases. If it has been seen that arbitrators often need injunctive power 
in order to make a just decision, then a functional interpretation 
necessarily concludes that arbitrators need to have such power, 
regardless of the language of the arbitration agreement, arbitration 
rules, or lex arbitri (unless, of course, they explicitly exclude it). 
This seems also to be the holding in case law.58 The functional 
interpretation, or "inherent powers" argument, is sometimes found 
57 Vogel v. Símon, 26 Mise. 2d 436, 201 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y. Supo 1960); Suffolk Development 
Corp. v. Pat-Plaza Amusement Corp., 236 N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y. Supo 1962); United Eleetrical 
Radio and Machine Workers of Ameríca ti. Honeywell Jnc., 522 F.2d 1221 (1975); Matter of 
Arbitration between Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO and Jsbrandtsen 
Company, 1nc., 36 Mise. 2d 617, 233 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1962); Mz1lcr Brewing Company v. 
Brewery Workers Local Unían no. 9, 562 F. Supp. 1368; ICC Award no. 7453/1994 Yearbook 
of C011lmercial Arbítration, VoL XXII (1997), p. 107-124; Service Employees International 
Unían, AFL-CIO, CLC 1). Local, 70 F.3d 647 (1st Cir. 1995); Cook ti. Mishkin, 95 A.D.2d 760, 
464 N.Y.S.2d 761 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1983). 
58 In the United States tbis rule has its origin in the arbitration of labour disputes. 
Perhaps beeause of their eomplexity and their passionate and, sometimes, bitter nature, 
it was thete earlier than anywhere else where the need for non-peeuniary remedies 
beeame evident. Labour arbitration disputes constituted the laboratory where the 
doctrines on the arbitrators' remedy power where first elaborated and tested. The 
landmark case law were the so-ealled "United Steelworkers Trilogy," named after three 
cases decided by the Supreme Court, all involving the named umon: United Steelworkers 
ti. American Mfg. Ca., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers ¡l. Warrior & Gulf Navigatíng 
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers 11. Enterpríse Wlzeel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 
(1960). In these cases, the Supreme Court set a presumption in favour of the competence 
and power of the arbitrators to fashion the appropríate remedy for the wrong. The 
applicable test was that the award u drew its essence" from the collective bargaining 
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together with arguments related to an expansive interpretation of the 
arbitration clause,59 but in other cases it is the sole reason for the 
arbítrators' power.60 Allowing an arbitrator to order injunctive relief 
wíthout a basis in the arbitration agreement or the applicable rules was 
the last threshold to be crossed in arbitration' s absorption of non-
pecuniary remedies. 
agreement. In the third case of the trilogy, the Court tried to qualify an expanded 
interpretation of its former statements by adding that "[A]n arbitrator is confined to 
interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to 
dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from 
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the 
collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to 
this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award." Since 
then, however, the view gradually held was that the policy in favour of arbitration 
justified arbitrators' fashioning an adequate remedy according to the circumstances of 
the case, a sort of "inherent" power, only limited by the eontract between the parties. 
See United Electrieal Radio and Maehine Workers of America v. HoneY1Oell lne., 522 F.2d 1221 
(1975) where the eourt stated: "While it is inappropriate for us to determine whether the 
contract before us would authorize an arbitrator to grant the declaratory and injunctive 
relief sought here, sueh relief is not inherentZy beyond the capacity of an arbitrator." With 
these precedents, and others where arbitrators had resorted to injunctive relief (Ruppert 
v. Egelhofer,3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958) the use of this remedial 
power was extended to the field of general commerdal and contract law. See Lin1000d v 
Sherry, 16 Mise. 2d 488, 178 N.Y.s. 2d 492, aff d 1Oithout op., 7 App. Div. 2d 757, 181 N.Y.S. 
2d 772 (1958); Cook v. Míshkín, 95 AD.2d 760, 464 N.Y.S.2d 761, (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 
1983), where the court stated of arbitrators that "Their function is to find a just solution 
to the eontroversy between the parties, and to that end it will be for them to "fashion the 
remedy appropriate to the wrong;" Sperry Int'l Trade, Ine. v. Gov't 01 Israel, 689 F.2d 301, 
306 (2d Cir. 1982); or Advaneed Micro De'oiees [AMD] v. Illtel Corp., 9 Cal. 4th 362,885 P.2d 
994, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581 (1994). In an intemational setting, the analysis has been mueh 
focused on the power to order interim measures of proteetion, where the "inherent 
powers" approach has taken root. See DONOV AN, Donald Francis, Powers of the 
Arbitrators to Issue Procedural Orders, including Interím Measures of Protection, and 
the Obligation of Parties to Abíde by Such Orders, ICC International Court 01 Arbitration 
Bulletin, Vol 10, no. 1, Spring 1999, p. 61; McDONNELL, The Availability of Provisional 
Relief in Intemational Commercial Arbitration, Columbia Joumal 01 Transnational La1O, no. 
22 (1984), p. 273; HOELLERING, Michael F., The Practices and Experíenee of the 
American Arbitration Association, in: Conservatory and Provisional Measures in 
International Arbitration (Paris, ICC Publishing, 1993) p. 31. See, however, ICC Award 
74530f1994. 
59 Freydberg Bros., Ine. n. Lewis Con'Y, 177 Mise. 560, 31 N.Y.S.2d 10 (N.Y. Supo 1941); 
Suffolk Developmeut Corp. v. Pat-Plaza Amusement Corp., 236 N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y.Sup. 1962); 
Vogel v. SimoTl, 26 Mise. 2d 436, 201 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y.Sup. 1960). 
60 Sperry lnt'l Trade, Inc. v. Gop't of Israel, 689 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1982); ICC Award no. 
74530f1994. 
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3.6 Orders of performance, arbitrators' power and the law 
applicable to the substance of the dispute 
Until here we have analyzed the arguments in favour of 
arbitrators' power to order performance as if such were a procedural 
issue. However, as pointed out aboye, the question of arbitrators' 
powers remains relevant, even if the issue is treated as one of 
substance. In that case, one needs to examine the powers of the 
arbitrators in relation to the substantive law applicable to specific 
performance, and the degree of discretion they enjoy in this respecto 
3.6.1 Arbitrators, orders to pe~foml, and substantive law 
This section attempts to answer the question of the extent of the 
arbitrators' margin of discretion in ordering performance under the 
applicable substantive law. On the basis of the case law examined, the 
answer is: "very wide." Examples support that arbitrators go far 
beyond what the standard interpretation of the law would authorize in 
awarding or denying an order of performance. 
On the one hand, arbitrators sitting in common law jurisdictions 
have awarded specific performance in cases where, typically, the law 
provides for a denial of the remedy, such as contracts for personal 
services61 or construction contracts.62 In Stak1inski v. Pyramid Electric 
Company, a leading case, the arbitrator ordered the reinstatement of a 
managing director of the company, since he considered that the 
contract clause on dismissal in case of disability had been wrongfully 
interpreted.63 The arbitrator did not stop at the fact that, under a 
simple application of standard American contract law, the solution 
61 DOBBS, Dan, The Law of Remedies Damages - Eqllity - Restitution op. cit. § 2.5(4) p. 98; 
TREITEL, Sir Cuenter, Remedies for Breadz of Contracto A Comparative Account (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1988) p. 47; CORBIN, Arthur Linton, Corbin on COlltracts, Volume 12; 
CORBIN, Arthur Linton, Restitution, Specific Peiformmlce, Eleetion of Remedies op. cit., 
§1164, p. 283; JONES, Careth I COODHART, William Specific Performance, op. cit., p. 169; 
McCLINTOCK, Handbook Oll Eqllíty § 61, p. 101; POMEROY, John Norton, Pomeray's 
Eqllity Jurispl'UdellCe and Equitable Remedies op. cit. § 759, p. 1275. This was anticipated as a 
problem for the remedial power of arbitrators. See FLEMING, RW., Arbitrators and the 
Remedy Power, op. cit,. p. 1215. 
62 AXELROD, Eliot L., Judicial Attitudes Toward Specific Performance of Construction 
Contracts, University of Dayton Law Re'l'iew, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1981), p. 38; POUND, 
Roscoe, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, Equity, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 33, no. 3 
(1920), p. 434; OLECK, Howard L., Specific Performance of Builders' Contracts, Fordham 
Lazo Review, Vol. 21 (1952), p. 156; LENNARD, Gary L., Specific Performance of 
Construction Contracts - Archaic PrincipIes Preclude Necessarv Reform, Natre Dame 
Law, Vol. 47 (1972). p.1027. ' 
63 Staklíllski V. Pyramid Electric Ca., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1959). 
THE POWER OF ARBITRATORS TO MAKE PRO-FUTURO ORDERS 113 
would have been to compensate the aggrieved party.64 In Grayson v. 
Robinson Stores, the arbitrators ordered the performance of a contract 
for the construction of a mall, even though for such agreements, as for 
all requiring extensive supervision of construction works, the remedy 
is generally denied.65 
On the other hand, there are also examples where arbitrators have 
denied an order of performance, even if the applicable substantive law 
had provided for it. Such was, in our opinion, the case of the Zürich 
Chamber of Commerce arbitration award No. ZHK 273/95.66 The case 
concerned an international sale of goods with the CISG as applicable 
law, and the buyer requested performance of the contracto Article 46 
CISG provides for performance as of right, with few exceptions. 
Nevertheless, the tribunal denied the request with a shocking paucity 
of detaíls as to why it did so. True, Article 28 CISG provides for the 
right of a court to deny the remedy when it would do so under its own 
law,67 but this provision was primarily conceived for common law 
judges. Despite the fact that it would not be hard to expand the 
reference to a "court" so to include an arbitral tribuna1.68 Yet the 
problem would be to interpret the reference to "its own law," as it is 
not entirely clear what is the "own law" of an arbitral tribunal. It 
depends on the views of arbitration.69 These views notwithstanding, in 
64 IndeedT in the enforcement stage, the court admitted that the marginalization of 
specific performance was, in part, due to the specificities of the traditional division 
between jurisdiction at law, and jurisdiction in equity, something that was not applicable 
in arbitration. "The fact of the matter is that much of equity jurisdiction and relief is 
pattemed on fue assumption of the test of the adequacy of the relief at law. This has 
undoubtedly influenced the areas where equitable relief is denied on other substantive 
grounds, such as is involved here [ .. .]. Bence, when there is an adequate remedy at law 
equity will the more quickly refrain from granting the extraordinary relief that has been 
historicaIly associated with equity. But in tIre case of arbitratiollllo distillctioll is made between 
tfrese fonlls of relie!, fhe dic1wtomy of wlzich is lzistorically associated with the deuelopment of our 
courts." Staklinski v. Pyramid Elecfric Compally, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1959). 
65 Grayson-RobillsOIl Stores, lile. v. Iris COllstr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 
1960). 
66 Arbitral Award ZHK 273j95 31st May 1996. Available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
casesj 960531s1. htm!. 
67 Supra § H.2. 
6S In this sense, see Article 1.11 of the UNIDROIT PrincipIes, which provides that: "In 
these PrincipIes [ ... J ' cour!' includes an arbitral tribunal .... " 
69 If arbitration is seen as a system that mirrors ordinary justice, then the role of 
arbitrators would be roughIy equaI to that of judges, being compIetely subject to the Iaw, 
and with the only difference that they are appointed by the parties. If arbitration is seen 
as a contraet, then the law will play no significant role unless the parties so provide, with 
the eontract being almost the only source to be used by the arbitrators to draw their 
conclusions. Between these two views .• there may be a multitude oí mixed approaches, 
where the law plays a more or less significant role. Finally, other views have suggested 
that arbitration must be seen autonomously and independently from ordinary justice. 
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that case the arbitration took place in Switzerland, a civil law country 
whose law, like the OSG, exhibits a preference for specific performance. 
Thus, even appIying Article 28 CISG in the context of arbitration, it 
would have been hard not to grant the request for performance in the 
specific case. Yet the arbitral tribunal denied it without much discussion 
on the contents of the law. The conclusion to be drawn is that, in case of 
arbitration, Article 28 OSG is, probably, inadequate and insufficient. The 
room it grants vis-á-'vis specific performance is still too narrow compared 
with the discretion that arbitrators exercise in practice, as the Zürich 
Chamber of Commerce Award showed. 
3.6.2 Arbitratars, arders ta perfarm, and public palicy 
Even if arbitrators enjoy wide discretion when dealing with 
substantive 1aw, they need to remain within the boundaries of public 
policy - either international, or of the country where the award needs 
to be enforced.70 An arbitrator could thus see the triumph of a novel 
approach to performance be trounced by having the award set aside. 
That being said, however, there is not much room for the 
operation of public policy principIes in relation to orders of 
performance. That conclusion can be asserted authoritatively since the 
challenges to the enforceability of the award have been scant, 
unsuccessful, or unrelated to the remedy. 
One of the challenges to the enforceability of an award containing 
an order of performance has been the argument arbitrators who, 
contrary to judges, lack imperium and could not have the power to 
make such an order.71 Naturally, this objection was rejected on the 
Arbitration would constitute a service oí dispute resolution, and arbitrators respond to 
that motive. Further on tbese jurisdictional, contractual, mixed and autonomous views 
of arbitration, see LEW, Julian, Applicable Law in 11lternatiollal Commercial Arbitratíoll (New 
York, Oeeana, Dobbs Ferry, 1978) p. 189-198. 
ro See article V.2 (b) of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of .Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
71 In the United States this rnatter was dealt with in eady industrial disputes. At that 
time the views on arbitration could hardly be disentangled from those in ordinary 
courts. In consequence, the diseussion on the expansion oí arbitrators' power to grant 
remedies was argued in comparison with the powers of a chancellor. Obviously, such 
parallel inevitably drew on the public v. private nature of ones' and another's powers, 
and was resolved in the negative. In this sense, the Michigan Supreme Court stated that 
"an arbitrator is not a chancellor. He possesses no equitable powers excepting as the 
submission may expressly grant such. He is in no position to mollify, qualify, or 
straddle, and he has no right to dictate specific types of reHef outside the scope of the 
submitted issue or issues, once he has decided the latter." Carr v. Kalamazoo Vegetable 
Pardmlellt Co., 354 Mich. 327,332, 92 N.W.2d 295, 296 (1958). That an arbitrator is not the 
sarue as a chancellor, everyone can see. FLEMING, R.W., Arbitrators and the Remedy 
Power, op. cit. p. 1205. Once the differences in nature are settled, however, the question 
THE POWER OF ARBITRATORS TO MAKE PRO-FUTURO ORDERS 115 
grounds that the imperium does not relate to the order of performance, 
but to the coercive mechanisms that may be employed to make that 
order effective. Therefore, provided that those always lie with national 
courts, the imperium argument is not persuasive.72 
In other cases, the objection to performance orders has been 
formulated by putting the notion of "public policy" on a level with that 
of H equity principles."73 Such construction has suffered an outright 
rejection, as it would leave the door open for Anglo-Saxon courts to 
scrutinize the contents of any performance award, to check whether 
the solution complies with that expected from a court of equity?4 
More particular subjects of controversy have been the limits to 
specific performance, and the debate over whether or not they could be 
characterized as public policy criteria. Public policy nature has been 
denied to the rules limiting specific performance in contracts with 
extended supervision,75 or contracts for personal services.76 
is whether the fact that arbitrators draw their powers from the agreement predudes 
them from issuing imperative orders. And the answer is in the negative, since they have 
to rely on the State's enforcement meehanisms. 5ee Tomo v Kumagaí, París Court of 
Appea! (lre Ch. Civ.), 19 May 1998. 
72 In Tomo v Kumagai the eourt stated: "Et eonsidérant que l'absenee d'ímperium de 
l'arbitre a seulement pour eonséquenee de le priver de tout pouvoir eoercitif 11. l'égard des 
parties et des tiers en subordonnant notamment l'efficacité de sa décision 11. l'exequatur 
de l'autorité publique¡ qu'elle ne lui interdit pas en revanche, lorsque telle est sa mission, 
de preserire aux parties des obligations de faire sauf 11. faire dépendre l'exéeution foreée 
de sa décision du contróle préalable de l'autorité publique." Tomo v Kumagaí, Paris Court 
of Appeal (Ire Ch. Civ.), 19 May 1998. 
73 In Young v. Deschler, 202 Mise. 811, 110 N.Y.S. 2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1952), though the court 
enforced the award, it left a dangerous precedent by stating that "A court will not render 
a decree which shocks good conscience or is otherwise offensive to equity," thereby 
supporting the view that an award has the nature of a contracto 
74 In Staklinski ~'. Pyramid Electrie Company, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78 N.Y. (1959), the 
court firmly stated: "There is no controlling public policy which voids an arbitration 
agreement like this one and the courts are not licensed to announce a new public policy 
to fit the supposed necessities of the case." 5ee also Pn'Ydberg Bros., Inc. v. Lewis Carey, 
177 Mise. 560,31 N.Y.S.2d 10 N.Y. Sup. (1941), where the enforcement court held: "Nor is 
there any merit to the daim that the arbitrators in the instant case may not properIy 
award relief in the nature of a decree of specific performance. There is no rule of law 
limiting the relief which an arbitrator may award to money judgments, even in cases 
where no equitable decree would be proper if the controversy between the parties were 
being determined by a court rather than by arbitrators." 
75 Grayson-Rabinson Stores, Ine. ll. Iris COllstr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 
1960). 
76 Though the problem of extended supervision was more dearly outside the scope of 
public policy, in the scenario of labour relations this issue was all but clear. Indeed, one 
of the unsolved problems left by the United Steelworkers Trilogy was that of cases where 
the remedy fashioned by the arbitrators drew its essence from the agreement but implied 
the specific performance of contracts for personal services. FLEMING, R.W., Arbitrators 
and the Remedy Power, op. cit. p. 1215. In the United States, this issue has been dealt 
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Final1y, in sorne cases where a State interest constituted an 
obstacle to the order of performance, this concerned the actual 
enforcement rather than the substantive contents of the order, making 
it difficult to disentangle public policy from the Act of State doctrine. 
Such was the case in Ministry of Defense of the Islamie Republie of Iran v. 
Gould, Ine,77 Arbitrators ordered the delivery of specific equipment, 
and, as a result of the United States trade restrictions towards Iran, 
delivery was not possible. The performance of the contract did not 
involve, in abstract terms, any violation of public policy. It was the 
with on several occasions. First, the problem was mainly restricted to a certain statute 
(the 1932 Norris-La Guardia Act, also known as the Anti-Injunction Bill) which was 
adopted as binding law in most of the States. Such law precluded from issuing 
injunctions in employment disputes. In Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 
129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958), there was a request for an injunction to enforce an anti-
strike and anti-slowdown provision in thecollective bargaining agreement. The 
arbitrator awarded it, and the award was enforced by the court, which held that, while 
the Norris-La Guardia Act represented an important policy, the award was also 
protected by another strong policy, namely that of favouring arbitration. Provided 
arbitrators drew their powers from the arbitration agreement and that it was not likeIy 
that the parties drafting such agreement intended to limit the powers of the arbitrators as 
to become ineffective, upholding the award constituted the best way to reconcile both 
arbitration policy, and the policy behind the Norris~La Guardia Act. The later evolution 
of these views led arbitrators to face the more eumbersome issue of the enforcement of 
an individual services contract in cases like Freydberg Bros., Ine. '(1. Lewis Corey, 177 Mise. 
560,31 N.Y.S.2d 10 (N.Y. Supo 1941), where the award was upheld. Later, in Staklinskí n. 
Pyramíd Electric Company, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1959), the dissenting opinion 
by Judge Burke said that the enforcement of the award was contrary to "the statutory 
policy confiding to directors the management of public corporations and the principIes 
of equity barring injunctive relief of thi8 nature." The majority view, however, upheld 
the award, arguing that there was no threat to personal freedom, which constitutes the 
main public poliey eoneem in the enforcement of contracts for personal services. 
77 Ministnj of Defense of the Islalllic Republic of Iran n. Gould, Inc. 969 F .2d 764 (9th Cir. 
1992). In 1975, the Govemment of Iran entered into an agreement with Hoffman Export 
Corporation ("Hoffman") for tIle sale of military communications equipment and related 
services to Iran In January 1978, all shares of Hoffman stock were acquired by Gould, 
lne. The United States embassy in Teheran, Iran, was seized and diplomatic personnel 
taken hostage on November 4,1979. Once the crisis ended, Iran and the U.S. reached the 
compromise of setting up the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Hoffman (later Gould) 
brought a claim before the tribunal for breach of contract, which the Ministry of Defence 
of Iran contested with a counter-claim by on the same terms. The tribu~al held that 
neither party had breached the contraet, since the hostage crisis amounted to a case of 
force majeure, with the result of the discharge of the parties' obligations under the 
contracto Besides monetary obligations, the tribunal held Gould to be "obligated to make 
available" to Iran certain communications equipment in the possession of GMI. 
Aecording fo the Court of Appeals, the Claims Tribunal award fell under the Convention 
on the Recognitioll and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and thus was returned 
to the district eourt. The district court only modified the award in one respect: 
Respondents were relieved of the obligation to make available to Iran the 
communications equipment beeause the distriet court determined that "doing so would 
violate United States export restrictions." 
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actual delivery to the contract party that was problematic. SimilarIy, in 
investment arbitration, we find references to the denial of specific 
performance as a remedy on the basis that it cannot be ordered against 
a sovereign State - again, an objection that is unrelated to the contents 
of the obligation.78 
In summary, public policy principIes should not play a strong 
role in the issue of performance orders in arbitration. Even if the 
contents of an order of performance were contrary to public policy, the 
most normal situation would be that the very obligation for which 
compliance was requested was itself contrary to public policy (for 
example, a request for the performance of an agreement contrary to 
competition law). The objection would thus be to the right, not the 
remedy. The previous evidence should also suffice to trounce those 
views suggesting that specific performance is contrary to the 
foundations of international arbitration due to the enforcement 
problems they pose, and that specific performance should therefore be 
excluded on the basis of public policy principles?9 Difficulty of 
enforcement does not, in itself, qualify as a public policy principIe. 
Indeed, the reaction to difficulties encountered in rendernig justice 
should not generally be a retreat but a move forward, and a 
development of the legal mechanisms of enforcement. 80 Furthermore, 
far from the dismal and messy scenario depicted by the specific 
performance' s detractors, the reception of the remedy in international 
arbitration,81 and even in purely domestic arbitration in Anglo-Saxon 
countries,82 can hardly be more encouraging. FinalIy, if awards 
ordering performance may create enforcement problems in an 
international setting, monetary awards have no guarantee of success 
either, as case law shOWS.83 
78 Libyan American Oil Co. (UAMCO) 1'. Gov't of the Libyan Arab Republic (1981) 20 LL.M.l. 
79 ELDER, Troy, The Case Against Arbitral Awards of Specific Performance in 
Transnational Cornmercial Disputes, Arbitration Intemational, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1997). 
80 That is general1y the argument employed by common law scholars to dismiss the 
difficulty of supervision as an absolute objection to the requests for specific performance. 
See AXELROD, Eliot L., Judicial Attitudes Toward Specific Performance of Construction 
Contracts, op. cit. p. 39; DOBBS, Dan B., The Law of Remedies. Damages - Equity -
Restitutioll, op. cit. § 2.5(4), pp. 99-100 
81 See Spem} Int'l Trade, Jnc. v. Gov't of Israel, 689 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1982); ICC Award 
no. 7453 of 1994; Tomo v Kumagaí, Paris Court of Appeal (lre Ch. Civ.), 19 May 1998. 
82 See Cook v. MislzkilI, 95 A.D.2d 760, 464 N.Y.S.2d 761 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1983); 
Stak1inskí v. Pyramid Elec. CLl., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1959); Youug v. Desclzler, 
202 Mise. 811, 110 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Graysoll-Robinson Stores, Inc. íI. Iris COllstr. 
Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1960). 
83 In order to prove the case against arbitral awards of specific performance, scholars 
have referred to case law in the context of disputes with a State party - specifically to 
the triad of cases after the Lybian nationalization process. See ELDER, Troy, The Case 
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4. WHAT'S NEXT? NON-PECUNIARY REMEDIES AND 
FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR ARBITRATION 
The conclusion seems to be quite straightforward. If the issue is 
regarded from a more procedural perspective, arbitrators enjoya wide 
power to make non-pecuniary orders, committing the parties' future 
activities. Nevertheless, even if the issue is regarded from a more 
substantive view, arbitrators have the broadest autonomy to frame 
non-pecuniary orders, the criteria of substantive law notwithstanding. 
Hence, this being an already settled issue, we should wonder whether 
and to what extent it is still worthy of further study. 
The answer to this question is in the affirmative, as soon as we 
realize that aH the examples used to illustrate the problem involved 
cases where the remedy requested was, merely, the specific 
performance of the contract terms. The issue becomes far more 
problematic when we abandon the cornfortable scope of the strictness 
of contract terms, and jump into the field of orders whose content is 
partially based on the language of the contract but also on general 
duties, hence aiming at doing justice in the specific case, and restoring 
the balance between the parties. Such pro futuro orders (we cannot tag 
them as orders of performance anymore) demonstrate that the 
arguments and examples used for our previous findings constitute 
only the tip of the iceberg of a much wider problem. Perhaps this 
phenomenon is better explained through an example. Imagine two 
manufacturers of electronic equipment that conclude a general 
cooperation agreement, in which they undertake to exchange 
Against Arbitral Awards of Specific Performance in Transnational Commercial Disputes, 
p. 26-29. First, account must be taken that cases with a State party do not illustrate the 
general remedial problems faced in a standard arbitration, but a specific and very 
idiosyncratic case. Second, the triad of Lybian cases would serve, if anything, to prove 
the opposite point for which they are raised. Of these cases, in the Texas Overseas 
Petroleum Col California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Gov't of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 ILM 1 (1978) 
(Dupuy, sole arb., 1977) (Topeo case), the private party requested specific performance, 
i.e., compUance by the Lybian govemment with the investment contract and restitution 
of the concession, and the arbitrator conceded it. On the other hand, in Líbyan American 
Oil Company (LlAMCO) v. Gov't of the Libyan Arab Republíc (1981) 20 I.L.M. 1 (LlAMCO 
case) the arbitrator denied the request for specific performance and awarded damages 
instead. When we come to the enforcement process, the Topeo case was settled quickly 
and amicably: Topeo renounced its right of performance in exchange for monetary 
compensation, which was promptly paid by the Lybian government. ,The LlAMCO case, 
on the other hand, went through a whole enforcement nightmare, with several processes 
in different countries aimed at seizing the State' s assets, with the increased cost this 
implied, only to have several of them denied on the basis of the State's immunity from 
execution. See CRAIG, W. Laurence; PARK, William W.; PAULSSON, Jan, Intemational 
Cltamber of Commerce Arbitratioll (3'" ed., New York, Oceana Publications, 2000), p. 672. 
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technology in order to both ensure a secondary source of it. After 
some time, one of the companies begins to act reluctantly with regard 
to its part of the agreement, haggling over minor details, in what 
seemed a wilful attempt to de1ay the compliance with its duties. The 
other party took the issue to arbitration. The arbitrator found that the 
balance of the agreement had been upset and needed to be restored. 
For that purpose, he ordered the breaching party to grant the other a 
free license for a specific producto The original contract between the 
parties, however, did not include any explicit reference to it. Did the 
arbítrator act within her powers? 
If some may think this case a bit outlandish they only need to 
examine the records of Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) V. ]nfel 
Corporation.84 In that case, the arbitrator issued an order (equitable 
remedy, in his words) that, despite being a performance order, did not 
call for the stríet performance of the specific contents of the contracto 
In such a case, even with the precedents on specifíe performance, the 
response as to whether the arbitrator was entitled to order such a 
remedy was less than clear. After the award was rendered, the 
enforcement stage turned into a tennis match, with the first instance 
confirming the award,85 the second revoking the decision and denying 
enforcement,86 and finally the Supreme Court of California upholding 
it again.87 
The possible reasons for a sense of uneasiness with these kind of 
remedies are diverse. First, it could be argued, if an order does not call 
for the stríet performance of the contract, the relationship between 
right and remedy is less immediate.88 That makes it necessary, again, 
to scrutinize the issue carefully from the procedural perspective of the 
powers of the arbitrators. Moreover, orders like this, unlike traditional 
84 Advanced Micro Devices [AMD] v. Intel Carp., 9 Cal. 4th 362, 885 P.2d 994, 36 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 581 (1994). 
85 Advanced Micro Devices [AMD] v. Inte! Carp., 858 P. 2d 567 (Cal. 1993). 
86 Advanced Micro Devíces [AMD1 v. Iutel Carp., 16 Cal. App. 4th 346, 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993). 
87 Advanced Micro Devíces [AMD] v. I¡¡fel Carp., 9 Cal. 4th 362,885 P.2d 994, 36 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 581 (1994). 
88 In a brilliant article, Professor Chayes dealt with the evolution of litigation in the field 
of public Iaw, one of whose main factors was the disentanglement of right from remedy. 
CHA YES, Abram, The Role af the Judge in Public Law Litigatian, 89 HARV ARD L. REV. 1281, 
1299-1300 (1976). We merely took the liberty oí extrapolating his conclusions to the field 
of private law. Indeed, we argued before that the division benveen substance and 
procedure was the more subtle when the connection benveen right and remedy was 
closer. See COOK, Walter Wheeler, 'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws, 
op. cit. p. 343; Copylease Corp. of Am. v. Memorex Corp., 408 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
Thus, the looser the relationship, the more we approach the procedural perspective, 
where uncertainty reigns. 
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justice, are not intended to solve past grievances but to articulate the 
parties' future relationship. That "executive" or "management" task is 
extraneous or, at least, unsettling, to the essence of adjudication.89 
In the context of our study, however, we need to focus not so 
much on general questions of jurisprudence, but on actual problems of 
arbitration. And the fact is that the previously described exercise of 
remedial power still constitutes a puzzle, even if the debate is 
restricted to the exercise of the arbitral function, and poses problems 
for which there is not a unique and c1ear answer. 
We should begin by examining the problem of contract 
modification by arbitrators. Although there is sorne experience with 
the application of equitable devices such as reformation of contracts in 
the arbitral context,90 arbitrators are still wary of the limits of their 
power to modify a contract if the parties have not expressly authorized 
them to do SO.91 Now let us take a gIance at the case previously 
described. By using his remedial power to issue an order of 
performance, the arbitrator was, in reality, modifying the contract, 
introducing new obligations into the parties' relationship.92 
This immediately poses a problem of coherency. Theoretically, 
contract modification and contract remedies should be two different 
aspects with respect to the powers held by the arbitrators. It seems, 
however, that such is not the case anymore: the expanded use of orders 
to perform is transforming them into instruments to change the 
contract, but without the proper scrutiny of that mechanism. 
There is a second concero that such pro futuro orders should raise. 
Current dispute resolution systems are evolving, and increasingly 
combine elements of arbitration with others from mediation and 
concilíation. As a result, those mechanisms can be inserted within the 
89 Professor Lon Puller already analyzed the compatibility of pro futuro orders with the 
judicial function, answering in the affirmative. See FULLER, Lon, The Forms and Limils 01 
Adjudication, 92 HARVARD L. REV. 353, 391-392 (1978). 
90 Initially, arbitrators requested an express authorízation by the partíes. See In re 
Vincent J. Smith, Jne., 19 A.D.2d 763, 241 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1963). However, the position later 
evolved towards the admission of such remedy as an almost "inherent" feature of 
arbitral powers. SCM Carpo V. Fisher Pal'k Lane Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 390 
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1976). See BEDELL, Stephen P; EBLING, Louis K, Equitable Reliel in 
Arbitratíon: A SU1"l1ey 01 American Case Law, 20 LOYOLA 1. J., 1, 551988. 
91 See UNCITRAL Award of May 4, 1999, Yearbook 01 COlllmercial Arbitratioll no. 13 
(2000), p. 61, taken by Professor Berger to exemplify the cumbersome nature of the 
problem of the ability of arbitrators to modify the contracto See BERGER, KIaus Peter, 
Renegotiation and Adaptation 01 Jl1temational 111vestment Contracts: The Role 01 Contraet 
Drafters and Arbitrators, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1347,1353 (2003). 
92 Indeed, the arbitrator was creating ex ¡¡OVO a (free) license for technology that the 
parties had not contemplated in their original agreement. See Advanced Micro Devices 
IAMD1 v. fntel Corp., 9 Cal. 4th 362,885 P.2d 994, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581 (1994). 
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contractual relationship and not merely used as a last resort for 
irreversible crises. That implies a more flexible role for arbitrators, but 
also the confusion between the exercise of arbitration and mediation 
functions and between the formation, performance, non-performance, 
and remedial stage of the contracto In this context, it will be 
increasingly hard to distinguish between orders of performance, orders 
to preserve the status qua during the negotiation/ arbitration, orders to 
restore the contractual balance and allow a productive negotiation, 
orders that attempt merely to bring parties to the negotiating table, and 
orders whose purpose is to enforce a general duty of good faith, in the 
contract or during the negotiations.93 . 
Again, this poses an evident problem of coherency. If arbitrators 
are awarded more discretion under a particular kind of order than 
under another, they are likely to employ it for ends it was not 
conceived for and to engage in H power-shopping," picking the 
doctrine most adequate for their purposes. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Despite the disdain exhibited by scholarly writing, the issue oí 
non-pecuniary remedies has erupted onto the arbitration stage and 
plans to stay, gradualIy playing a more significant role. The íncreased 
complexity of disputes; the need for arbitrators as service providers to 
offer a better and more comprehensive performance, and the 
incorporation, in sorne cases, of the dispute resolution mechanism into 
the formation, execution and completion stages of the contract, pose 
challenges for which the basic elaborations provided so far can hardly 
give an answer. 
In the cases examined, the problem of non-pecuniary orders was 
each time dealt with according to the very specific circumstances of the 
case, which created a sort of balkanization of the issue. The willingness 
93 In Advanced Micro VerJÍees it was not entirely c1ear whether, besides restoring the 
balance between the parties, the arbitrator fashio;;'ed the deseribed remedy as a means of 
punishing rntel for failing to comply with ¡ts duty to negotiate in good faith and, if so, 
whether that would be a duty under the contraet, or a duty of the negotiation process 
once the dispute arose. Burton, for example, argues that the remedy had an exemplary 
component. See BURTON, Steven J., Combining Conciliation with Arbitration of 
International Commercial Disputes, 18 HASTlNGS rNT'I> AND COMP. L. REV. 637,648-49 
(1995),. Regarding this problem, again, the parallel with industrial relations cases can be 
usefuI, sinee in that eontext we see fue manifest need for arbitrators to adapt to a 
dynamic environment where negotiation i8 alternated with performance, and arbitrators 
must be capable of shaping fue parties' agreement and enforce its provisions, as well as 
the general duties of good faith. See FLEMING, R.W., Arbitrators and the Remedy 
Power, op. cit. p.1199-1200. 
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to respect specificities notwithstanding, this article argues for the need 
of an approach based on uniform principIes. 
Those uniform principIes necessarily have to address our problem 
from several perspectives. First, the limits of an expansive 
interpretation of the arbitration clause and the arbitration rules chosen 
by the parties need to be ascertained. That perspective also needs to 
distinguish between cases where the parties merely intend to setlle 
past grievances and cases where there are problems likely to stretch 
themselves into the future. Second, when applying arbitration laws, 
we need to examine the strength of national public policies supporting 
arbitration to stand a clash with the policy supporting the respect for 
the letter of the contract. Third, a betler effort needs to be made to 
define the arbitral functions when mediation, negotiation, conciliation 
and arbitration are closely intertwined. Only in this way may an 
imperative order made by an arbitrator be evaluated, and the excesses 
of power be tackled. 
In summary, reason needs force to be imposed (words and paper 
are nothing without the swords of men, said the Leviathan). In the case 
of arbitral pro futuro orders the problem is the opposite, as the policies 
supporting arbitration have backed every exercise of power by 
arbitrators to order non-pecuniary remedies. It is now time to build 
rules and principIes to be the framework within which such force is to 
be exercised. 
